Cisco Live AMER 2026: Using LLMs and Endace Full Packet Capture for Incident Response

Original Entry by : Barry "Baz" Shaw

By Barry “Baz” Shaw, Senior Engineering Manager, Technology Partner Programs, Endace


Barry

At Cisco Live AMER 2026 Endace debuted an MCP (Model Context Protocol) server for the integration of EndaceVault into the emergent agentic Security Operations Center (SOC), providing access to 200TB of full packet data and on-demand packet analysis to all agents present in the SOC.

Going into Cisco Live we had key questions about the utility of PCAP data to agents, how to manage making terabytes of data available without overflowing their context windows, and whether the models could parse, analyze and make judgements from the PCAP data comparable to that of an analyst. Results from some simple tests are extremely encouraging and indicate a bright future for agentic AI in the SOC.

Endace Always-on Packet Capture

Two of Endace’s newest EP94C8 EndaceProbes were installed in the GovWare SOC to provide full packet capture to support the conference SOC directives of Protect, Educate, and Innovate.  Full packet capture provides unique insight into all activities on the network, delivering critical context and evidence for Incident Response and Threat Hunting teams.

The EndaceProbes each hosted three VMs that were running Zeek and delivering critical log data into Splunk.  Custom Zeek script additions provided additional valuable details around clear text passwords in email and HTTP, and the use of insecure protocols.  Zeek was also used for file-carving and automated submission of objects to Splunk Attack Analyzer and a beta of Endace’s new Vault API used in a Cisco XDR automated workflow was field tested.   

PCAP and AI – a key question answered

In this scenario we wanted to test the ability of a reasonably new on-prem model to make incident judgements based on PCAP data.  Using the qwen-3.6 model and Open WebUI, a DNS buffer overflow attempt flagged by Cisco Secure Firewall, and raised as an incident in Cisco XDR, was chosen as the candidate.

Cisco Live USA 2026: Possible Buffer Overflow Attempt Flagged
Cisco Live AMER 2026: Possible Buffer Overflow Attempt Flagged

Using the Endace XDR workflow integration (which automatically creates Endace Pivot-to-Vision and EndaceVault links directly in the worklog) a quick pivot from Cisco XDR to EndaceVision shows DNS traffic present:

Investigating the suspect DNS traffic in EndaceVision
Investigating the suspect DNS traffic in EndaceVision

After pivoting from EndaceVision into Wireshark, we can see DNS activity and some large query responses.  This verification served as the analyst judgement to be compared with the LLM findings.

Examining the actual packets in Wireshark lets us validate the AI agent's analysis.
Examining the actual packets in Wireshark lets us validate the AI agent’s analysis.

In Open WebUI a new chat was opened, the Endace MCP connected as a tool, and the following prompt was issued:

There was a firewall alert called ‘PROTOCOL-DNS Microsoft SMTP excessive answer records buffer overflow attempt’ recorded for the traffic between IP addresses <redacted> and <redacted> at 2026-06-03T15:24:01.000Z and 2026-06-03T15:22:33.000Z. Can you get a packet decode from Endace and either confirm or deny the existence of DNS responses that would match this alert.

The model’s reasoning is shown in the following screenshot:

The AI agent's reasoning before starting the analysis.
The AI agent’s reasoning before starting the analysis.

The Endace MCP tools contain detailed annotations that provide context to the model. Above we can see this context helping the model choose between different time inputs and correctly identifying that the start and stop times provided in the prompt were (accidentally) transposed in the prompt.

The AI agent prepares to retrieve and analyze the packet data.
The AI agent prepares to retrieve and analyze the packet data.

Once the AI issued the tool call to the Endace Vault API via the MCP, the extraction of the related PCAP data began. To make this data more consumable by AI, it is converted to JSON by the Endace Vault API and streamed back in manageable sized chunks. The AI can request additional chunks as required, which protects the context window from being swamped by a large PCAP download.

An example of the returned JSONified PCAP data is shown below, this is the raw data that the AI has to make its determination.

A sample of the packet data returned in json format
A sample of the packet data returned in json format

After consuming the JSONified PCAP data the AI began its analysis, clearly having parsed the PCAP data and displaying an understanding of the DNS protocol. From the name of the alert, it understood the specific details pertaining to the alert and was able to look for these in the DNS packets:

The AI agent shows its reasoning and the resulting analysis.
The AI agent shows its reasoning and the resulting analysis – Part 1.
The AI agent completes its analysis and outlines its conclusion.
The AI agent shows its reasoning and the resulting analysis – Part 2.

The reasoning of the model makes for interesting reading. It can comprehend the nature and specifics of the alert and use this to reason about the DNS packets.  It successfully found an oversized DNS response and provided unprompted enrichment by determining the hosting provider of the DNS server.

The AI Agent completes its analysis and outlines its conclusion.
The AI Agent completes its analysis and outlines its conclusion.

So far, the model has performed admirably, validating the firewall alert and the analyst judgement.  To take things further, we asked the model to do some extra analysis over and above the human analysis we’d done. While this chat was user driven, we expect that this is the kind of autonomous activity AI agents will perform on their own.

The AI was asked to confirm the hosting provider and look at the contents of the large DNS response to determine if it contained a malicious payload or was in fact just a verbose and unusually large response.

Can you confirm that the destination host <redacted> is in fact Microsoft hosted?  Is there anything in the large DNS response that could be malicious or is it just a DNS response?

The AI Agent elaborates on its initial conclusion when asked for additional analysis.
The AI Agent elaborates on its initial conclusion when asked for additional analysis.

The model has told us that the source of the DNS response is a reputable domain and that the payload of the response was just a large number of regular AAAA records.  In a pre-AI SOC, the analyst would need to spend time inspecting the PCAP in Wireshark (if they had access to full packet capture in the first place) to determine this was a false positive.

Conclusion

While this example was intentionally not an autonomous agentic finding, the model was able to determine that this alert was a false positive by analyzing the PCAP.  The fact that relatively small open-source models can successfully extract findings from PCAP data is a major validation of their utility in the agentic SOC. We expect that frontier models will provide even richer analysis of PCAP data when available in the SOC if the token cost can be justified. A possible architecture is an on-prem first approach, escalating to a frontier model in the event on-prem cannot make a confident determination.

By using an agent to investigate events like these, and having access to full PCAP data, alerts can be triaged by the agent, requiring only a cursory review by a human analyst to definitively close cases in record time. This validates the core concept that the agentic SOC will improve overall efficiency and accuracy by optimizing incident triage and freeing up time for analysts to work on the more complex incidents that threaten enterprise operations.

Acknowledgements

Our thanks go to the Cisco SOC team, led by Jessica Oppenheimer and Ivan Berlinson, for the opportunity to integrate EndaceProbes with the Cisco Live Agentic SOC architecture. 

The SOC team is a collection of Cisco and Splunk experts across many domains who were a pleasure to work and innovate with, and we came away with a great appreciation for the power of the Cisco Security and Splunk tools.

The Endace and Cisco teams were able to prove out integration innovations and test them in earnest in a real-world environment in preparation for making them generally available to the market.

More from Endace, Splunk and Cisco in the SOC series

Read more from Endace about the Cisco Live USA 2026 SOC:

Read related Cisco Team Blogs from the Cisco Live USA 2026 SOC: 
https://blogs.cisco.com/security/clamer-soc-2026

For more Endace blogs in our SOC series, see here:
https://blog.endace.com/tag/soc/ 

Event SOC Website 
Visit Cisco’s Event SOC website for full details of the SOC setup, and download the whitepaper written by Jessica Oppenheimer:
https://www.cisco.com/site/us/en/products/security/event-soc-report.html


Cisco Live USA 2026: Supporting Encryption vs. Using Encryption – when the best laid plans go astray

Original Entry by : Elliott Hinson

By Elliott Hinson, Integrations Engineer, Endace


Elliot Hinsen, Integrations Engineer, Endace

Are you actually using encryption, or does your software simply support it?

The answer may seem silly, but there lies a hidden amount of complexity behind this question that many users never have the need or opportunity to approach.

At the Cisco Live USA 2026 Security Operations Center (SOC) we found a great number of instances of users using technology that supported encryption. However, through some form of misconfiguration or a sheer lack of knowledge, they had configured their system to not use the encryption that their software did, in fact, support.

Sony DSLR FTP uploads

The first incident that I would like to discuss regards a user operating a Sony DSLR camera with automated photo upload enabled. Most DSLR cameras these days offer a Wi-Fi or Bluetooth connectivity option to offload photos for later processing.

While sifting through log data in Splunk, we discovered one user at the conference had configured automated image uploading to an FTP server in the cloud directly from their Sony DSLR camera.

Because this was configured to an FTP cloud server, and because we had the full packet data recorded via the EndaceProbe, we were able to inspect the username and password for the login credentials of this FTP server, which were being broadcasted in the clear over the network. Furthermore, thanks to Endace’s file carving ability, we were even able to reconstruct the original file uploads that the user had sent to the cloud over the Wi-Fi network, also unencrypted.

This represented one of the lower risk level incidents of supporting encryption without using encryption because the photos were intended to be used at the Cisco Live Conference, and they were not particularly private. One could imagine an incident, however, where much more private photos had been taken on a similar camera system, and those photos could be gathered by any nefarious actor with access to the Wi-Fi network.

This problem is particularly unfortunate, since a quick perusal of the Sony documentation for that particular model of camera shows that they very clearly do support encryption in the form of SFTP or FTPS. However, the user had not configured these and was unaware that they had been uploading their photos and password in the clear all week.

Recorded data upload dates and times shown in EndaceVision.
Recorded data upload dates and times shown in EndaceVision.
Extracted images were reassembled from the packet data using Zeek.
Extracted images were reassembled from the packet data using Zeek.

POP3 email, using the wrong port

This flavor of incident resulted in several users being invited into the SOC for us to inform them of the dangers of using unencrypted email. The POP3 protocol, as well as the SMTP protocol, do support encryption. However, once again we found users were connecting to their email servers with mail clients that had not been configured to enable encryption. It had merely asked them for a port number, and the user, not knowing which port number to use or why that may be important, had simply selected the default.

This was quite convenient for us, since their username for their accounts was their email address (and their email login password was also exposed). So, all we had to do was use the email address that we had seen passing, unencrypted, over the network to send them an email inviting them to the SOC to improve their security posture. For one of the users, it was as simple as changing the mail client to use the POP3 port that supported encryption.

This represented a much higher risk level of incident, since not only was the username and password for their email accounts in the clear, but we could also reconstruct emails for several users with this problem. That allowed us to uncover an additional problem. Some of these users were using a network monitoring solution that also did have encryption enabled and was sending email reports containing sensitive information about the state of their laptop computers in the clear. The issue was fixed by digging through a nested menu to check a box that enabled encryption.

What was interesting was that this network monitoring software was attempting to send unencrypted email reports to service providers that were actually returning error codes indicating that they did not support receiving unencrypted email. However, while the service providers were attempting to stop this unencrypted email system from being received, this did not preventing the user’s client software from sending their username and password in the clear for anyone to see.

Almost encrypted office-suite

This next incident was particularly tragic because of how much effort the user had clearly put into attempting to ensure their security by supporting encryption at multiple layers of their software stack.

Once again sifting through Splunk logs and corroborating those Splunk logs with the original packet data – available to us from the EndaceProbe in the Cisco Live SOC – we discovered a user who had configured a self-hosted Office 365 alternative on their Android smartphone so they could synchronize and manage contacts, images, and important documents using a self-hosted office suite server.

Initially, we thought this was a case of some user setting up an office suite on a home network and port forwarding that instance to the open internet using their home router. This obviously is not a recommended way to expose a private service to a remote user, but is still very commonplace due to users not fully understanding the risks of such a setup.

In this case, however, upon further inspection we discovered this office suite server was running behind a Cloudflare TLS termination gateway. We also saw that encryption for the WebUI had been configured correctly so attempts to access a non-encrypted version of the login page would automatically redirect to the encrypted page.

The one weak link in the system was that this particular Android client had been configured to use the unencrypted webDAV endpoint and was not following redirects because it was not a full web browser.  It was at this point that we realized, tragically, that we were observing a user who:

  • had properly put their self-hosted office suite system behind a Cloudflare DDOS protection gateway
  • had properly configured TLS for the service
  • had properly HTTPS redirection in place.

However, since they did not have port 80 configured to only allow HTTPS redirection and not allow any other access to the services via port 80, and because the android client was defaulting to using port 80 but not being redirected, the user was leaking sensitive credentials and business information for anyone to see.

Authentication data transmitted in the clear because of a simple, overlooked, mis-configuration.
Authentication data transmitted in the clear because of a simple, overlooked, mis-configuration.

Conclusion

To wrap all this up, and provide a moral to this collection of stories: just because your software stack supports encryption does not guarantee that it is necessarily using that encryption. You have to make sure that all software is configured correctly to be using the encryption that it will most likely already support. Furthermore, most firewalls and security systems won’t flag unencrypted traffic as it is not necessarily malicious nor is it inherently risky to the network operator.

The only way we discovered this was thanks to the use of Splunk logging and its integration with Endace’s always-on packet capture system. This allowed us to reconstruct the full packets for these incidents – which a smart PCAP system or a firewall triggered PCAP system would never have seen.

Acknowledgements

Our thanks go to the Cisco SOC team, led by Jessica Oppenheimer and Ivan Berlinson, for the opportunity to integrate EndaceProbes with the Cisco Live Agentic SOC architecture. 

The SOC team is a collection of Cisco and Splunk experts across many domains who were a pleasure to work and innovate with, and we came away with a great appreciation for the power of the Cisco Security and Splunk tools.

The Endace and Cisco teams were able to prove out integration innovations and test them in earnest in a real-world environment in preparation for making them generally available to the market.

More from Endace, Splunk and Cisco in the SOC series

Read more from Endace about the Cisco Live USA 2026 SOC:

Read related Cisco Team Blogs from the Cisco Live USA 2026 SOC: 
https://blogs.cisco.com/security/clamer-soc-2026

For more Endace blogs in our SOC series, see here:
https://blog.endace.com/tag/soc/ 

Event SOC Website 
Visit Cisco’s Event SOC website for full details of the SOC setup, and download the whitepaper written by Jessica Oppenheimer:
https://www.cisco.com/site/us/en/products/security/event-soc-report.html